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NERO DE MORIBUS
BY M. J. GOLDBLOOM
PLACE : A room in the palace of Nero, Rome.
TIME: 60 A. D.
CHARACTERS: Nero Claudius Caesar, a brilliant but rather er-
ratic youth of 23, Emperor of Rome.
Seneca, teacher of Nero, a well-known Stoic,
not too clever.
Paul, a Nazarene, formerly Saul, a Pharisee.
SENECA—Nero, this is Paul, the Jew who's here on an appeal
to your judgment in some religious quarrel or other in Jerusalem.
I've been talking to him and found him quite interesting. He's really
very well educated. I brought him to you because I thought you
might enjoy conversing with him, and besides, it might be well for
you to see what he's like before passing judgment on him.
Nero—According to Horace, Aristius Fuscus, that man "whole of
life and free from crime," refrained from business on Saturday in or-
der not to insult your people, Paul, so I suppose I can't very well do
less than give you a few minutes of my time before having you exe-
cuted, especially since Seneca assures me I'll enjoy the conversation.
Paul—To a free-born Roman citizen, Caesar, you could grant no
less.
Nero—Seneca, what are the charges against this fellow?
Seneca—Inciting to riot, blasphemy, sedition, disorderly conduct,
and holding a public meeting without a license.
Nero—Oh, I see. He got up on a street-corner and said something
that someone in authority didn't like. Well, I'll tell you what,
Paul. If I find your conversation sufficiently interesting and intel-
ligent, I'll let you off, but if you turn out a bore, like some of Sene-
ca's other friends, I'll crucify you, and you'll have cause to be thank-
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fill that my naturally gentle disposition won't permit me to treat
you in accordance with your deserts.
Seneca—I'm sure that you'll find Paul very interesting, Nero.
Nero— I hope so, for his sake. Now, Paul, what did you say to get
yourself into trouble?
Paul—I merely asserted the immortality of the soul.
Nero—Well, I don't see just what there is for anyone to be annoyed
at in that, although it seems to me a rather vicious doctrine, tend-
ing to take men's minds off this world in favor of a problematical
next.
Paul—But, Csesar, that is just the highest virtue of a belief in
immortality. Man should turn away from this world, for it is wicked.
Nero—What ! do you call this world wicked, in which there are so
many fair prospects for the eye, so many pleasing sounds for the
ear, and in which one may know the many and various joys of the
body, the pleasures of eating, drinking, and especially love? What
have you to say to such blasphemy, Seneca ?
Seneca—I agree with you Nero, that Paul is wrong in saying we
should turn from this world, but you seem to me to advance utter-
ly improper reasons. We should think of this world, not, as you
suggest, as the scene of our sensual gratifications, but rather as
the sphere of our duties. Only a very few indeed, Nero, can be
happy, like you, in the immediate satisfaction of their every desire.
For most, the pleasures of this world are far outweighed by its
pains, and hence for them the argument in favor of this world based
on the joy of life possesses no force. But all alike, pauper or pub-
lican, slave or Csesar, have their duties in this world, and hence
all alike should feel impelled to devote themselves to their duties
in it, and to it as the sphere of their duties rather than to any chim-
erical other world.
Nero—Your arguments, Seneca, have succeeded in convincing me
that Paul is, in a way, right. For I see that, as you say, this world
ofifers no worth-while attractions to the overwhelming majority of
my subjects. Hence it is well, even perhaps essential, that they
should keep their eyes fixed, not on this world, but on some other.
For if they were to keep their attention centered on this world, they
could not well help seeing it for what it is, and realizing their own
misery and its contrast with the happiness of the few, which is ob-
tained by their oppression and starvation. And then, as always oc-
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curs when they see the real state of things, they would rise up and
deprive us of our privileges, and perhaps also of our lives. This
unfortunate state of affairs is happily averted by religion, which,
turning men's hearts towards heavenly things, prevents them from
pondering their earthly woes. What has your religion to say, Paul, as
to the proper behaviour for the poor?
Paul—He whom I preach said, "Render to Caesar the things that
are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's." But I myself
have said also, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.
For there is no power but of God ; the powers that be are ordained
of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the
ordinance of God ; and they that resist shall receive to themselves
damnation."
Nero—An admirable religion for the people, to be sure. An ex-
cellent slave-morality it is. Religion is in all truth the opiate of
the masses and a most necessary and efficient opiate at that. It is
a great comfort to a slave and his family, when, having toiled from
dawn to dark of a scorching summer's day under the lash of an
overseer in a Sicilian wheat-field, they gather around the altar to
render thanks to Juno Lucina that the latest baby has been still-
born and will not have to endure the same travesty of life as its
parents. And think of the joy of the free-born Roman citizen who,
though hungry and ragged, is enabled by the beneficient influence of
religion to celebrate the Saturnalia and Floralia, or to honor Bac-
chus, Venus of the market-place, or even Hercules in the amphi-
theatre. Yes, it is fortunate for me and those who, like me, have
plenty, that there is religion to turn the eyes of the masses away
from this world and their suflferings in it to some problematical
other, where they may find bliss, or at least to gods, by trusting
in whom they may be comforted, and may not feel their burdens
so heavily.
Seneca—You seem to think, Nero, that only by being made to
turn their eyes away from this world to some other can the people
be made to suffer peacefully and willingly the miserable lot which
they must here endure. But this is not so at all, for the considera-
tion that it is their duty to obey their masters, and to labour for
them, is by itself quite sufficient to cause them patiently to bear their
suffering, and gladly to serve in order that the chosen few may have
plenty.
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Nero—Yon, Seneca, keep talking about duty. Will you kindly
oblige us by informing us what you conceive this duty to be?
Seneca—A man's duty is that which he must do if he would
be righteous.
Nero—And by what method, will you be so kind as to tell us, do
you plan to discover what course of conduct a man who would be
righteous will pursue?
Seneca—-That, Nero, is a question very simply answered. Every
man has within himself a conscience, implanted by nature, and which
tells him to act in accordance with the law of nature. All that is
necessary for a man to do in order to be righteous is, that he fol-
low the dictates of his conscience in all things. What could be sim-
pler than that?
Nero—Your solution, Seneca, is indeed simple, so simple as a mat-
ter of fact, that when carefully examined, it proves, like almost
all simple solutions, to involve a number of irresolvable difficulties.
First and foremost, permit me to ask what we are going to do about
men who are so inconsiderate as to have consciences which ne-
glect to dictate that they follow the law of nature? It seems to me
quite conceivable, even highly probable, that such persons may exist,
especially in view of the rather distressing fact, that you Stoics,
while perfectly agreed that your consciences direct you to follow
the law of nature, have nevertheless managed to disagree, as to just
what the terms of that law of nature are, which your consciences
direct you to follow. And not only that, but do not all Stoics differ
radically from all Epicureans in their views as to what is right?
Seneca—What, Nero, would you assign any value to the opinions
of the Epicureans on any subject whatsoever! Has all my teach-
ing been in vain ! Have all my patient labors been in sufficient to
preserve you from the pernicious doctrines of that abominable sect
!
O, Nero!
Nero—I was not advocating the beliefs of the Epicureans : I was
merely pointing out that they differ from yours, a fact which you
seem hardly inclined to dispute. And while the Epicureans may be
most detestable persons, they are nevertheless existing human be-
ings, and since their consciences do not dictate the same course of
action as yours, why then it is obvious that conscience is not suf-
ficient by itself to determine what is right and what is wrong.
Seneca—But the Epicureans, knowing what is right, merely re-
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frain, for the sake of their personal comfort, from doing or even
declaring it, and hence are wicked.
Nero—In that case I need only point to the Cynics, against whom
it is obvious that you could not possibly level any such accusation,
and who, indeed, might well denounce you in just such terms. For
they, in truth, agree with you that men should live according to the
dictates of their consciences, but they appear to have consciences
which demand of them far stricter and more uncomfortable modes
of behaviour than those to which yours lead you. So you see,
Seneca, that if you declare that every man's conscience should be
his guide, you will find very little justification for any code of
morals, inasmuch as the disagreement of one individual will de-
stroy the universal validity of your whole system, and each man
will be a law unto himself. Is this, Seneca, what you desire? If so,
then where does your concept of duty come in? How can you pos-
sibly justify it?
Seneca—Well then, though it would appear to lead to no solution
if we accept the validity of the judgments of every man's conscience,
I think it is quite possible for us to escape the difficulties which you
have raised by assuming that only a few men are sufficiently highly
developed to see what their duty is.
]\Tgjjo
—But Seneca, waiving the consideration that this latest sug-
gestion of yours fails to provide for a sense of duty in the great
mass of the people, and these are therefore left with nothing to
hold them in check and prevent them from rising up and ridding
themselves of us—waiving this consideration, I say, it is still neces-
sary for me to determine which of several different standards of
righteousness is the true one. For as I have already pointed out.
great differences of opinion exist between one school and another,
and even within any given school itself, as to what constitutes the
good life. I am afraid, Seneca, that if you hope to convince me
of the tenability of your position it will be necessary for you to sup-
ply me with some criterion by which it shall be possible for me to
judge betwen one ethical system and another, and decide wherein
lies the true way to achieve the good life. Can you supply such a
criterion, Seneca?
Seneca—Nothing could be easier. That concept of duty is the true
one which is the most useful. The value of every action is to be
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judged by its utility. If a deed produces more pleasure than pain,
then duty directs the performance of that deed, and vice versa.
Nero—Yes, nothing could be easier than to set up utility as the final
standard to which all codes of duty shall be referred, the final ar-
biter of the righteousness of any act. It is, however, unfortunately
also true that nothing could be more futile. For firstly, Seneca,
you will require a table of equivalents for pleasure and pain. Will
you not be so kind as to permit me to see this table, which you have,
of course, already prepared? For without it you would certainly
be unable to decide as to what were the correct ethical standards
to adopt, while you have, on the contrary, come to so definite a
decision on the subject, that you are quite ready to condemn im-
mediately as a fool, a knave, or both, anyone who may chance to
disagree with you concerning it.
Seneca—I am sorry, Nero, but I have never given the question of
such a table any thought. Consequently, I am quite unable to present
you with it. However, I do not believe it necessary, for we are all
able to weigh pleasure against pain with sufficient accuracy for all
njormal purposes.
Nero—I have no such faith as you appear to possess in the innate
ability of the human mind to reduce all the diverse pleasures and
pains which exist to one common denominator. However, I might
as well waive the point, since any such table is obviously impossible
to construct, and your theory has several other equally vulnerable
points. Seneca, even leaving out the purely physical eflfects of every
act, is there anything done by anyone at any time, all of whose
consequences, with their attendant pleasure and pain, you would
be capable of enumerating? Before you reply, consider that everv
act of one of us may well have influenced every subsequent act of
that person, and every act which has immediately affected any other
person is likely to have played a part in every subsequent event of
his career, and so on indefinitely.
Seneca—No, I can't possibly, I must admit, know all the remote
consequences of any act, and I am therefore unable to arrive at
any more than a rough approximation in any judgments as to the
pleasure and pain produced by any act. But I still maintain that
such a rough approximation is ample for any practical purpose. We
are justified in neglecting the remote and untraceable efifects of
any act on the theory that the result of any act in the determination
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of Other events grows less as we go farther away from the original
situation, and furthermore, that in the remote effects of an act,
good and evil will probably occur in about equal quantities and
counterbalance each other.
Nero—Well, Seneca, although it would be extremely easy for me
to point out to you that, in the first place, if you hold an act to
be right or wrong according to its consequences, you must assume a
universal" reign of causality, so that every act may have consequences
by which it can be judged, and under such conditions, every act
continues of uniform importance in the causal mesh through all
eternity ; while secondly, if we are justified in assuming that the
pleasure and pain attendant on the remote consequences of any act
will balance one another, we are equally justified in assuming the
same of the immediate effects ; although, as I said, these things
would be so easy to point out, I shall refrain from doing so. In-
stead, I shall ask you if you are possessed of perfect and infallible
knowledge of the future.
Seneca—Of course not ! Such knowledge only a god could possibly
possess, never a mortal man.
Nero—Since you admit that you are not equipped with foreknowl-
edge absolute, it is obvious that you can not infallibly predict even
the immediate consequences of anything you may do. Hence, if one
accept this ethical theory of yours, one must, in order to be logical,
concede that, while a deed may be declared good or bad, such judg-
ment may only be given after the fact, and that it is the veriest
lunacy to claim that these epithets may be transferred from the deed
to the doer.
Seneca—But if we do not accept these criteria, our whole moral sys-
tem breaks down. Ethical judgments become impossible, and we
are left with chaos.
Paul—Not at all. All your difficulties arise from the fact that you
seek for truth in man's reason, rather than in God's will. What is
right, is right because God has commanded man to do it, and what
is wrong is wrong because He has forbidden it.
Nero—But why should man obey God?
Paul—Man should do God's will because God created man, who
therefore owes Him obedience.
Nero—But if God created man, why did he not create him perfect
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and incapable of doing other than God's will? C)r is your God
limited in His power?
Paul—God created man free to choose between good and evil, for
what would be the point of God creating automatic beings without
the power of choice? Where would there be any moral element in
such a system? It would be quite as senseless, purposeless, and un-
intelligent as the most thorough-going mechanistic and materialistic
system which man could conceive—such a system, for instance, as
Stoicism.
Seneca—You're doing a grave injustice to Stoicism, Paul. Why,
the good life is central to Stoicism, and
—
Nero—Paul's sideswipes at Stoicism will have to remain unrefuted
for the present, Seneca ; I have no particular interest in debating the
desirability of Stoicism as a cosmological system. But tell me, Paul,
does your God give men any incentive to lead them to prefer the
good to the bad? For admitting this rather paradoxical idea of free
will, I still think that this will ought to have something on a basis
of which it may act. If it were to act merely from the motive of
obedience, it would, I think, be just such an automatic device as
you have already pointed out and can have no ethical value. On
the other hand, a will acting purely irrationally would hardly be
free in any worth-while sense of the term.
Paul—God has offered man the most cogent possible reason for
choosing to do right rather than wrong—he will suffer eternally
in Hell if he doesn't.
Nero—Waiving the question of the moral nature of a God capa-
ble of creating beings to suffer eternally, I must still ask you how
it is, that, with so good a reason for righteousness as the fear of an
eternity of pain, men should nevertheless do wrong so large a por-
tion of the time?
Paul— In reply to the question which you have been so kind as not
to require me to answer, I will say that God had a very good rea-
son for condemning the greater portion of mankind to Hell. For
in view of the fact that population tends to increase in geometrical
progression while the means of subsistence increase onlv in arith-
metical progression in equal periods, it would have occured that,
if all men had gone to Heaven, the population would very soon have
outstripped the food supply, and either all the blessed would have
been grossly undernourished, or many, perhaps most, of them would
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have had to starve altogether, a state of affairs which would have
made a veritable Hell of Heaven. Therefore God created Hell to
take care of the surplus population, and sent the greater portion
by far to Hell, admitting only a very few indeed to Heaven. As a
consequence of this, the per capita food supply of Heaven is con-
stantly increasing, while the means of subsistence in Hell fall ever
further behind the needs of the population. Thus the blessed
are getting blesseder and the damned are getting damneder every
day. As to your other question, men sin in spite of Hell because
they are all descendants of the first man, Adam, and fell in his sin,
and are in consequence born in sin and incapable of avoiding it
no matter how hard they may try. Adam was created before Hell,
and was threatened only with death as the punishment of sin. More-
over, he thought he would be able to keep his disobedience hidden
from God—an idea of which he was speedily undeceived.
Nero—Your explanations interest me greatly, Paul, but there are
still certain points which I wish you to clear up for me. In the first
place, if all men are equally incapable of doing right, how have we
the right to make moral judgments concerning them? Are they
not all alike sinful, no matter what they may do or refrain from
doing? And where, may I ask, will this Heaven which you mention
get its inhabitants.
Paul—You are quite right, Caesar, in saying that we may not pro-
perly make moral judgments concerning men, because they are all
equally sinful. For Jesus Christ Himself, Who was God incarnate,
said, "Jrdge not. that ye be not judged." And as to the inhabitants
of Heaven, while it is impossible for any human being to achieve
unaided the goal of righteousness, he may nevertheless do so through
the grace of God. For God sacrificed Himself on the cross to atone
for the sin of Adam, and man may therefore, by mystically parti-
cipating in His death and rebirth through the rite of baptism, be-
come pure and incapable of sin.
Nero—Then are all your Christians incapable of sin?
Paul—That is the case.
Nero—But do not many of them do things which are normally con-
sidered sinful?
Paul—Whatever they may do, no matter how it would normally be
considered, cannot be sinful, for they are incapable of sin.
Nero—Thus, Paul, you hold that a man is good or bad irrespective
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of the nature of his actions, and solely on a basis of whether or not
he has received the divine grace. Am I correct?
Paul—Quite, Caesar.
Nero— In that case we have arrived at the conclusion that we are
not justified in making moral judgments concerning persons on a
basis of their acts. Paul, I must congratulate you on holding so
eminently intelligent a view of the subject, and I will gladly acquit
you of all charges against you. But don't get into trouble again,
because Fm afraid that if you do, the power of public opinion will
force me to have you executed.
Seneca—But Nero, these ideas are positively immoral
!
Nero—You cannot reject my ethical theory, Seneca, on a basis of
ethical considerations derived from your own system, which has
already been shown to be untenable. But I have not time for fur-
ther discussion at present, as I have an appointment with Anicetus,
admiral of my fleet, to arrange with him about a little family mat-
ter, namely, the assassination of my mother.
